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He will, we are confident, skillfully guide this embryonic organization through its formative stages.

We further urge our acting chairman and new executive committee to plan a centrally located two-day work session this fall as Congress will then have adjourned, the association can occupy the center of the political stage, further itself, and the Republican Party as a whole.

STATEMENT ON NEED FOR ESTABLISHING REPUBLICAN STATE LEGISLATORS ASSOCIATION

In view of the demonstrated need for Republican State legislators to cooperate with each other, exchange information, develop joint programs, and help each other, and especially in view of our need to increase our numbers, the successful caucus and meetings held here are most encouraging.

Obviously, Republican State legislators cannot wait until next fall, when the Nation will be in the midst of congressional, senatorial, and Statewide election races, to continue the good work begun here by moderate, constructive, forward-looking Republican legislators.

The Republican State Legislators Association must now establish a forum to express seriously needed progressive ideas and actions to move our party forward, and to make State legislatures and their Republican legislators even more effective. No one will do this for us, the time has certainly arrived for Republican State legislators, on their own, to think through and to implement the actions they knew need to be taken to make Republican legislatures the majority in many States.

What we do is clearly up to ourselves, and we urge Republican legislators to take the initiative again, and to pioneer new ideas to meet the needs of the men and women who we are privileged to represent, and to expand Republican representation to millions of other citizens who would benefit by Republican legislators service.

(Mr. CURTIS (at the request of Mr. MORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. CURTIS' remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

SUGAR ACT INVOLVES DELICATE FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS

(Mr. FINDLEY (at the request of Mr. MORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, the proposed 5-year extension of the Sugar Act involves complex, grave and delicate problems of foreign policy.

U.S. sugar quotas are much desired by foreign producers. At present prices the quota premiums add up to a sugar-pie worth over \$1 billion for the 5-year period.

To get the biggest possible slice, most of the foreign producers hire lobbyists at high fees. Information on file at the Justice Department shows that 7 of these lobbyists get \$20,000 to \$50,000 in annual fees.

How the pie is sliced has a powerful impact abroad. When the Senate in 1962 withdrew an Argentine quota assigned earlier by the House, riots broke out in Argentina and the Dominican Republic.

Assignment of quotas can have tremendous economic impact abroad. Preferential treatment in a few short years converted a diversified agricultural economy in Cuba to a one-crop economy.

U.S. quotas are so attractive they are the basis for political power in some of the smaller countries.

This year the problems are especially sensitive. The assignment of quotas may have an important bearing on our policies in southeast Asia. For example, beleaguered Thailand seeks a quota.

Because the legislation covers 5 years, wise action is all the more important.

Clearly it calls for knowledge in foreign policy and trade and tariff matters beyond that usually required of the Committee on Agriculture.

The public hearings on the bill have consisted mainly in statements by lobbyists who obviously are serving narrow interests. No experts in foreign policy have been heard.

I therefore have urged that executive session hearings of the committee be scheduled at which State Department officials can present statements and be questioned and further suggest that key members of the House Foreign Affairs and the Ways and Means Committees be invited to take part.

This should aid the Committee on Agriculture in preparing for the delicate and difficult task of writing this legislation. We must take every precaution against rocking the foreign-policy boat.

WHEAT TO RUSSIA WOULD HAMPER OUR WAR EFFORT IN VIETNAM

(Mr. FINDLEY (at the request of Mr. MORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, concerned over recurring reports that President Johnson may clear the way for new wheat sales to Russia, last Friday I sent the following message to the White House:

HON. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
The President of the United States,
White House,
Washington, D.C.:

For the sake of American boys fighting and dying in South Vietnam I implore you to block the sale of U.S. wheat to Russia or any other Communist government. The fact that any such deal could be carried out only at heavy cost to American taxpayers makes it doubly reprehensible.

In my opinion another wheat sale to Russia will end all hope of free world trade sanctions against North Vietnam just as the wheat sale in 1963 wrecked our trade blockade of Cuba.

That transaction cost the taxpayers over \$42 million in the form of subsidies but the foreign policy price tag was incalculable. As soon as we sold wheat to Russia the British sold buses to Castro and how could we argue if the United States insisted on filling a strategic food gap for the heartland of communism? Why should not the British sell to a Communist outpost like Cuba? Other free nations quickly followed the British lead. Soon the trade blockade—which up to then had been working well—was a shambles.

Today American boys are fighting in the jungles of South Vietnam against enemy

forces supplied in part by heavy and continuing free world shipping into North Vietnam.

According to State Department officials we are now attempting to get free world nations to cooperate in the same type trade sanction against North Vietnam that once worked against Cuba.

If we approve a new wheat deal with Moscow we doom this effort to failure. To me it is incredible to even contemplate expanded trade with the Communist government which provides North Vietnam with the surface-to-air missiles which already have sent several U.S. airmen to their graves.

PAUL FINDLEY,
Representative in Congress.

HUMANE TREATMENT FOR LABORATORY ANIMALS: NEW ENGLAND PAPERS BACK CLEVELAND BILL

(Mr. CLEVELAND (at the request of Mr. MORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, there is a rising groundswell of public opinion calling for passage of meaningful legislation to provide humane standards of treatment for animals used in experimental scientific research. A number of my colleagues in the House have mentioned to me a sharp increase in the mail they are receiving on the subject.

Public opinion also is reflected in the newspapers. I am offering with these remarks copies of two editorials that appeared recently in the Keene, N.H., Evening Sentinel and in the Christian Science Monitor. Both newspapers have been valued supporters of this legislation and are to be congratulated for helping to call public attention to this important issue. I do hope that this increase of publicity will result in early public hearings on my measure and related bills and on prompt passage of a good humane, effective bill by the Congress.

The editorials follow:

[From the Keene, N.H., Evening Sentinel,
Aug. 18, 1965]

CONFUSED DELAY

In an editorial last May we reported that, with indignation building up around the country over the inhumane treatment of animals in research laboratories, "Congress may finally act on some of the legislation which has been introduced repeatedly."

We cited specifically a bill introduced by Representative JAMES C. CLEVELAND, of New Hampshire's Second District.

Today, more than 3 months later, not only has the Cleveland bill (and a companion one in the Senate, introduced by Senator JOSEPH S. CLARK, of Pennsylvania) not been acted upon, but the issue has been completely confused by more legislation, far weaker, known as the Rogers-Pepper bill.

The Society for Animal Protective Legislation is frantically trying to clear the air, in the hope of obtaining passage of the strong Clark-Cleveland bill and defeat of the weaker Rogers-Pepper bill.

Meanwhile, key people in the Humane Society of the United States and the American Humane Association have managed to further confuse the issue by going along with the weak bills and trying to create the impression that their views are representative.

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ernment as well as private business and organizations.

The Republican legislators have elected the respected Speaker of the Oregon Legislator, F. F. Monte Montgomery, acting chairman of the group. I am pleased to note the part played by the Honorable R. J. King, of St. Louis County, Mo., in bringing this organization into being. I ask unanimous consent to include in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the text of the formal announcement of the formation of the Republican State Legislators Association and certain positions taken at the first meeting.

REPUBLICAN STATE LEGISLATORS FORM ASSOCIATION, F. F. MONTE MONTGOMERY ELECTED ACTING CHAIRMAN, POLICY AND ACTION STATEMENTS ISSUED

PORTLAND, OREG., August 12.—Republican State legislators from over 30 States today organized the Republican State Legislators Association, elected Oregon Speaker Monte Montgomery as acting chairman and adopted a series of policies and action statements.

Speaker Montgomery stated that in a series of meetings Republican State legislators from around the country felt the need to work more closely and assist each other, and to try to increase their numbers in order to serve the public most effectively.

The Republican State officials unanimously elected Oregon Speaker Montgomery as their first acting chairman.

After formally establishing their association, they instructed their acting chairman and executive committee to hold an organizational work, planning and action session during the fall.

Speaker Montgomery, first Republican Speaker in Oregon in 10 years and a vigorous leader of progressive, forward-looking Republicanism, stated that among the proposals adopted by the Republican State legislators are the following.

1. Encouraging State legislators to testify before congressional committees and urging invitations and information to them from Congressmen as suggested by Congressman THOMAS B. CURTIS, St. Louis County Republican.

2. Supporting a bold new research and action program on the State level for an expanded and improved traffic safety program.

3. Seeking establishment of improved election machinery in order to make State elections more honest and to guarantee that every vote cast is accurately counted.

4. Setting up a Republican State legislators campaign committee to focus attention on legislative races, exchange information and personnel, conduct workshops and cooperate with interested groups in increasing able Republican representation in State legislatures.

5. The elimination of poverty is a traditional Republican goal. However, the war on poverty if improperly administered can destroy State government as a meaningful instrument to serve the peoples needs. In our constant desire to aid the States in exercising their responsibilities, Republican legislators will urge retention of Governors' veto power.

6. Formally organized the Republican State Legislators Association.

7. Instructed the acting executive committee and temporary chairman F. F. Monte Montgomery to organize a fall meeting to implement programs, actions, and plans on behalf of State legislators.

Members of the Executive Committee are: Speaker Monte Montgomery, Oregon, Assemblyman Charles J. Conrad, California, Senator Chester R. Hubbard, West Virginia, Representative Lee Johnson, Oregon, Representative R. J. King, Missouri, Senator Robert P. Knowles, Wisconsin, Assemblyman George

W. Millas, California, Senator Frank G. Miller, Georgia, Representative Rodney W. Ross, Maine.

Organizational assistance in originating and establishing the Republican State Legislators Association was given by the Oregon Council for Constructive Republicans and Republicans for Progress.

STATEMENT ON NEED FOR MORE APPEARANCES BY STATE LEGISLATORS BEFORE APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS ON LEGISLATION AFFECTING STATES AND LOCALITIES

The wealth of experience and talent among State legislators is not being adequately utilized. Properly marshalled, it can help improve legislation passed by the Congress affecting the people of our individual States and localities. But State legislators are not being invited to testify before congressional committees. Missouri Republican Congressman THOMAS B. CURTIS is a speech prepared for delivery before the Governor's Conference, Miami, Fla., encouraged State legislators to present ideas and evaluation for the mutual benefit of Congress, State governments and the people.

We propose an effectively functioning mechanism which will notify Republican State legislators of opportunities to present their views during congressional committee hearings. Arrangements also should be made to guarantee that Republican State legislators are actually invited to meet with the minority members of congressional committees while constructive, forward looking legislation and amendments are drafted. Competitive views must be brought vigorously to the attention of the overwhelmingly Democratic controlled Congress and executive department—and to the American people.

There are many in the Federal Government who think that all problems can be solved from Washington, by bureaucrats, and that local trial runs and experiences need not be considered. We believe that our State legislatures can serve as laboratories, providing ideal opportunities to initiate, experiment, innovate, improve, and evaluate ideas close to the people, rather than in Washington.

Accordingly, we urge the House and Senate Republican congressional leadership to implement the constructive suggestions made by interested Republican legislators and Republican organizations. The written and oral testimony of Republican legislators should be requested, presented, and used.

STATEMENT ON NEED FOR MORE REPUBLICAN STATE LEGISLATORS TO STUDY AND ACT ON TRAFFIC SAFETY PROBLEMS

The expanding use of automobiles, and the resulting tragic increase of death and injury on highways, represents a problem which Republican legislators can meet constructively to protect the lives and well-being of millions of American families. Since traffic safety is fundamentally a State and local problem, it is entirely appropriate for State legislatures to initiate forward-looking action programs. Recent congressional hearings, however, indicate this local problem may attract Federal solutions unless this vacuum is effectively filled with positive leadership.

Because automobiles and drivers are licensed by States and local traffic regulations prevail, Republican legislators have a unique responsibility to take the leadership in urging and providing more research and action for increased traffic safety and movement. We intend to meet that responsibility.

For years, some have pretended that traffic safety problems did not exist. No longer can we afford to keep our eyes only on the speedometer while driving by the fatal accidents and crippling injuries. Loss of life on the highways is always as serious as loss of life in combat.

Republican State legislators are aware that needed improvements in the auto traffic field have been studied. To present to the people of our Nation new practical improvements, experiments and, where necessary, legislation aimed at making automobile transportation safe and expeditious for the men and women—young and old—who drive every day for business and for pleasure, is a challenge Republican legislators should eagerly accept.

Because State legislators are closest to people and their needs, they have a rare opportunity to solve problems touching nearly every American family. Republicans can pioneer in the public interest with courage, imagination, and integrity. We recommend, therefore, that a special Highway Safety Committee be part of the work of the Republican State Legislators Association.

STATEMENT ON NEED FOR CAMPAIGN TO ASSURE HONEST ELECTIONS

Every qualified American is entitled to a fundamental heritage—the right to vote. Republicans historically have supported and urged passage of fair voting rights legislation and honest election procedures so that the rights and desires of all Americans to participate in our election process are guaranteed and fulfilled.

With the present flood of first-time voters, Republican legislators must provide all people in America with State election laws and establishment of fair election procedures to guarantee accurate elections.

STATEMENT ON NEED FOR REPUBLICAN STATE LEGISLATORS CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE

The Republican Party can and should make a major contribution to State government, because it is here that the problems of our people are most efficiently and sympathetically solved. We must mount a massive effort to continue to put forward State legislative candidates who have intelligence, vigor, competence, and the integrity to decide important questions in the public interest.

Freedom of the individual is protected and defended only by having two strong, competitive parties. If we allow those who seek the one-party system to prevail, they will destroy the freedom of choice so essential to our great country. Adequate hearings, and the submission of testimony and constructive amendments require the active participation of both of our great political parties.

Republican legislators require a clearinghouse to communicate ideas, exchange information, and coordinate participation in workshops and conferences devoted to furthering Republican action in State legislatures across America.

A committee should be appointed to coordinate and implement the establishment of a Republican legislative campaign committee.

STATEMENT ON APPOINTMENT OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF REPUBLICAN STATE LEGISLATORS ASSOCIATION, ELECTION OF TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN AND PLAN FOR FALL MEETING ON PROGRAM AND IMPLEMENTATION

To implement the Republican State Legislators Association, we recommend the appointment of the following State legislators to the organization's first executive committee:

Speaker Monte Montgomery, Oregon, Assemblyman Charles J. Conrad, California, Senator Chester R. Hubbard, West Virginia, Representative Lee Johnson, Oregon, Representative R. J. King, Missouri, Senator Robert P. Knowles, Wisconsin, Assemblyman George W. Millas, California, Senator Frank G. Miller, Georgia, Representative Rodney W. Ross, Maine.

We further recommend the election of Speaker F. F. "Monte" Montgomery as temporary chairman of the association. Representative Montgomery has shown vision and leadership here during the past few days.

TRIBUTE IN MEMORY OF EDWARD
F. SIMONICH

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there are occasions when men of great stature who are little known outside their own particular States pass on to the great beyond.

One of those occasions involves "Big Ed" Simonich, the football coach and athletic director at the Montana School of Mines. He was a man who made his mark in Montana and in the Northwest.

We all mourn the passing of "Big Ed" Simonich. While he coached at the School of Mines, now known as the Montana School of Technology, he did not win many games. Over a 10-year period, the School of Mines probably had the best victoryless record of any college in the country. During that period of time, the School of Mines lost 44 consecutive games.

I am happy to note that 3 years ago, when I attended their homecoming, their losing streak was broken. As a former student of the School of Mines, I am pleased that the team has since been able to win a few more games.

The School of Mines in Montana is probably the Nation's outstanding technological school and one of the great technical colleges in the world.

The record of the school is evidenced by the quality of its graduates and the contributions which they have made on all the continents of the globe.

With the passing of Ed Simonich, Montana loses one of its great citizens, and the School of Mines loses one of its great instructors.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the transcript of a radio broadcast by a personal friend of mine, Red Welsh, of Radio Station KOOK in Billings, Mont., covering the death of Big Ed Simonich, entitled "The Lives of Great Men All Remind Us—" be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the transcript was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE LIVES OF GREAT MEN ALL REMIND US

The death of Edward F. Simonich, coach of the School of Mines, adds another page to the remarkable history of the Montana Collegiate Conference.

For many years this intrastate collegiate league provided Montana with interesting and competitive athletic events.

It listed among its coaches four of the most remarkable individuals associated with Rocky Mountain area intercollegiate athletics.

Father Hunthausen coached Carroll College; Herb Kilndt was at Rocky Mountain; Oscar Bjorgum at Eastern; and Ed Simonich at the School of Mines.

Winning was important to these men—but not nearly as vital as how they won. Their boys played the game for all it was worth, but mainly for the sheer pleasure men derive from participating in contact sports against other men. Their athletes were students. Manliness was a basic requirement—on and off the field.

Time moves along. Other duties removed all but Big Ed from active coaching.

Father Hunthausen became Bishop Hunthausen of the Helena diocese. Herb Kilndt athletic director at Rocky. Oscar Bjorgum a full-time instructor at Eastern.

Last Sunday Ed Simonich also left the coaching ranks. He died of cancer.

Big Ed was quite a guy. An All-American at the University of Notre Dame—he also played professional football with the Chicago Bears. But he was at his best with the Orediggers from the School of Mines.

Year after year, Ed took a limited number of undersized kids who had never played much football and gave him opponents all the competition they would handle. Every now and then he'd beat one of the league powerhouses and draw cheers from fans throughout the State.

In the rugged town of Butte, Mont., where men are measured by exacting standards—Big Ed was unanimously respected.

He many friends will always remember Big Ed Simonich by merely quoting stanza 7 from the Psalm of Life:

"The lives of great men all remind us
We can make our lives sublime,
And departing leave behind us,
Footprints on the Sands of Time."

VIETNAMESE WAR MUST END AT
CONFERENCE TABLE SOONER OR
LATER

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Tribune of Great Falls, Mont., is one of the leading sources of public information in the State and the Northwest. It has followed a practice, for some years, of inviting comment in guest editorials from Montana public servants of differing points of view.

In this connection, I was invited by the Tribune to prepare an editorial for the issue of August 26. The subject chosen, Vietnam, is one which, currently, gives the greatest cause for anxiety in the Nation. The search for a decent and honorable end to that conflict preoccupies the President and it concerns us all very deeply. The question of Vietnam has been considered extensively in useful debate and discussion in the Senate and in the press during the current year. This discussion may be expected to go on, as the war goes on, until circumstances permit a just termination through negotiations.

One possible difficulty in initiating these negotiations may well be the great gap in communication which exists between the spokesmen in Hanoi and our own. I do not mean the absence of means of communication; there are many. I mean the absence of common ground of understanding from which to begin discussions. We have said, for a long time, that words do not necessarily mean the same thing to the Communists that they mean to us. That is true but this breakdown in communications is perhaps only partly one of ideology in this case. There is also the factor of a totally different language and the centuries of differing cultural experience which lie at the base of this language barrier. Yet that barrier must somehow be bridged from both sides. That is essential if there are to be negotiations of significance which might lead to a worthwhile settlement of the Vietnam conflict before it is too late for such a settlement.

It is for that reason that it is encouraging to find in the press of late a good deal of serious analysis, of a genuine striving to grasp the import of Hanoi's basic conditions for terminating the war which were set forth as long ago as last April immediately after President John-

son's speech at John Hopkins. It is as important to try to comprehend accurately what these conditions may mean in our comprehension as it is for us to be clear as to the meaning of our own approach to an end to this conflict.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial previously referred to, published in the Great Falls Tribune of August 26, 1965, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MANSFIELD SAYS VIETNAM WAR MUST END AT
CONFERENCE TABLE SOONER OR LATER

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—The following guest editorial was written by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, Senate majority leader and senior Montana Senator.)

In another month or so the monsoons will be ending in South Vietnam. That is a certainty in the timeless scheme of things in Asia. Unfortunately there is no similar certainty with respect to the problem of Vietnam. On the contrary, all indications are that the situation, as the President has said, will get worse before it gets better. Already Americans are in daily and deadly combat in South Vietnam in innumerable sorties. The casualty lists grow and the prospect of an expanding war of indefinite duration involving great numbers of Americans is very real. No American—in Montana or anywhere else—can put this prospect out of his thoughts for very long. It hangs as a cloud over all of us, especially over the future of the young men of the Nation and their families. It is cause for continuous concern to me as it is to every other Representative and responsible official in Washington. It is the number one demand on the time and anxieties of the President.

Our objective in Vietnam, as President Johnson has said many times, is limited. We have not the slightest need for South Vietnam as a strategic base or for any other purpose. No national interest requires that this southeastern tip of the Asian continent be an American preserve. What does concern us is that the people in South Vietnam should have an opportunity, free from outside pressure, to choose their own system of government; to that end, the President has said that we will not leave South Vietnam in the face of hostile force.

This limited objective does not require—indeed, it argues against—an indiscriminate war whose great toll of casualties would be taken largely in American forces and in Vietnamese peasants, men, women, and children. That kind of war would be a wasting conflict which could easily spread beyond Vietnam. It is the kind of war which could find us deeply and indecisively engaged for years in Asia, if it did not erupt in a sudden nuclear holocaust whose horrors no nation would be spared. From such a war only the Communist Chinese could expect to benefit.

The imperative job, then, it would seem, is to bring the conflict to an honorable end in negotiations as soon as possible. President Johnson has already made many attempts to move the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. Thus far they have been unsuccessful. These efforts will not be discontinued. On the contrary, they have been strengthened and they will be persisted in, at the United Nations, through diplomatic channels and in whatever other ways may become possible. The President in a recent statement suggested nine possible avenues by which such negotiations might be initiated.

Military power will continue to be used to give the greatest possible protection to the American forces already in Vietnam and to defeat the attempt to drive them out by

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force. But at the same time an active search for a cease-fire and stand fast and resort to honorable negotiations must be pursued. This conflict is going to end at a conference table sooner or later and the sooner the better for the Vietnamese people, for this Nation, and for the world.

MIKE MANSFIELD,
Senator from Montana.

STEEL INDUSTRY NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at press briefings this morning, the White House press officer, William Moyers, announced to the press that the President would meet with the principal negotiators of management and the unions in an effort to break the stalemate in the contract negotiations affecting the steel industry and, thus, to forestall a serious threat to the Nation's economy and all of its endeavors.

Everyone, I know, is hopeful of a fortuitous outcome for this meeting. To set the background for it, I should like to include at this point, by unanimous consent, the announcements and the responses to reporters' questions which were given by Mr. Moyers this morning. They are most helpful in clarifying the situation as it is developing.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NEWS CONFERENCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE, WITH BILL MOYERS, 9:30 A.M., AUGUST 30, 1965

Mr. MOYERS. I have a statement, which I will read for the cameras later if you want.

Question. By whom?

Mr. MOYERS. By me.

The President this morning received a very thorough and comprehensive report from Senator WAYNE MORSE and Under Secretary of Commerce LEROY COLLINS, on the fact-finding mission undertaken at the President's request on Saturday to the steel negotiations in Pittsburgh. Also present were Secretary of Labor WILLARD WIRTZ, Secretary of Commerce JOHN CONNOR and Mr. WILLIAM SIMKIN, Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.

Senator MORSE and Governor COLLINS gave the President, as he requested, a detailed analysis on the facts of the existing situation and the issues between the parties. Senator MORSE and Governor COLLINS agree completely that the negotiations continue to be stalemated and the parties alone are unable to reach a settlement.

The President therefore promptly decided to request the principal negotiators of both parties to come to the White House immediately to meet with him, Secretary WIRTZ and Secretary CONNOR. The President is sending his personal plane to bring the negotiators to Washington immediately. The President will meet with them as soon as they arrive.

Question. When do you expect that, Bill?

Mr. MOYERS. Early afternoon.

Question. How long was the President meeting with them this morning?

Mr. MOYERS. They met about an hour and a half.

Question. This was Abel?

Mr. MOYERS. No. There are 10 negotiators in all.

Question. Bill, are those people still here that met this morning?

Mr. MOYERS. No, they have gone.

Question. Where will these gentlemen arrive—Andrews?

Mr. MOYERS. They will arrive at Andrews. Let me give you the names of the principals who are coming here from Pittsburgh.

Representing the unions: Mr. I. W. Abel, president of the United Steel Workers; Mr.

Joseph P. Molony, vice president, United Steel Workers; Mr. Walter Burke, secretary-treasurer; Mr. Marvin Miller, assistant to the president of the Steel Workers; Mr. Elliot Bredhoff, general counsel, United Steel Workers; and Mr. James P. Griffin, director, district 26, of the Steel Workers.

Question. Do you know what district that is?

Mr. MOYERS. That is the Pittsburgh district.

Representing the management: Mr. R. Conrad Cooper, executive vice president, United States Steel Corp.; Mr. R. Heath Laffry, administrative vice president, United States Steel; Mr. Russell J. Branscomb, vice president of Bethlehem Steel; and Mr. Harold Lumb, vice president of the Republic Steel Corp.

That is all I have.

Question. Bill, do you know what time these gentlemen are going to arrive?

Mr. MOYERS. No. As I said this morning, probably early afternoon.

Question. Are they en route now?

Mr. MOYERS. The plane has left to go to Pittsburgh. To my knowledge it has not left to come to Washington.

Question. Are they bringing them all in one airplane?

Mr. MOYERS. At this moment I do not know the answer to that question. Only one plane went up.

Question. Did they send a big plane?

Mr. MOYERS. A jet star, which carries 13 passengers.

Question. Bill, the President has called for continued price stability. Is he opposed to any increase in steel prices, so-called selective—

Mr. MOYERS. The President indicated in his press conference that there must be continued cost and price stability in our American economy and "I expect full and complete responsibility in the current wage negotiations and I expect continued stability in steel prices."

I will reiterate that.

Question. Could you say whether he is opposed to any increase in steel prices?

Mr. MOYERS. I'll stand on the statement he made last week.

Question. The question is whether continued stability in steel prices means all prices or whether some kind of overall figure?

Mr. MOYERS. I'll stand on the statement he made last week.

Question. Bill, are they going to set up shop here in the White House?

Mr. MOYERS. They will be continuing the collective bargaining in the Executive Office Building.

Question. Does there come a point in the next 24 hours or so between now and midnight Tuesday when he begins considering invoking the Taft-Hartley Act?

Mr. MOYERS. I think any discussion of the Taft-Hartley Act is premature at this time. He is very hopeful that a steel settlement will be reached, and that in that settlement and in the process of collective bargaining, paramount will be the national interest, as he expressed at his press conference last week.

Question. Bill, can you tell us a little bit about the mechanics of this? When they come in they obviously will go to the White House and not the Executive Office Building?

Mr. MOYERS. He will meet with them as soon as they arrive, probably in the Cabinet Room. After they have talked a while, they will adjourn to the Executive Office Building where the collective bargaining will continue.

Question. Who will represent the Government in the sessions in the Executive Office Building?

Mr. MOYERS. Secretary CONNOR, Secretary WIRTZ, and Mr. BILL SIMKIN, who is director

of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.

Question. Does the President have any proposals to make today?

Mr. MOYERS. The President will propose again that the national interest is the overriding concern, which he hopes they will respect.

Question. Bill, on the mechanical business for guidance, do you expect to be able to advise us in advance when they will be arriving and will there be any session for pictures or will we be able to see them?

Mr. MOYERS. I am supposed to be called when they leave Pittsburgh, if they have a chance, and I'll try to keep you posted on all the details I can. Of course, these are meetings, as in Pittsburgh, which are going on between the principal parties and are not open. I am very hopeful of your having a change to see them.

Question. I wondered when they came whether we would be able to see Cooper, Abel and the President, or whether there would be any statement?

Mr. MOYERS. There will be no statement to my knowledge at this time, but I will keep you posted.

Question. We would like to have pictures if at all possible at the opening session?

Mr. MOYERS. I understand.

Question. Bill, how were they invited? Did the President call them?

Mr. MOYERS. The invitations were extended through Secretary WIRTZ and Secretary CONNOR.

Question. Bill, when did the President decide, A, to come back here and, B, to invite these people to come in here?

Mr. MOYERS. As I said to some of you yesterday after the press conference, the President had actually mentioned to several members of his staff on Friday that he very likely would come back to Washington sometime Sunday. Secretary RUSK was down and Secretary RUSK wanted to come back yesterday afternoon. Sometime Saturday night or early Sunday morning, I think the President decided to come back.

Yesterday after the press conference, the President received a tentative report from Senator MORSE and Under Secretary COLLINS, and at that time the President felt it desirable to meet with them this morning. This was after he had already made and announced his decision to come back to Washington.

He met with them beginning about 7:45 and that meeting lasted until approximately 10:15. As part of that meeting, the President decided, as I announced earlier, to request the principal negotiators to come down.

Question. Bill, has MORSE's and COLLINS' role now been ended?

Mr. MOYERS. Let me say first of all that the President was very impressed by the intensity and thoroughness of Senator MORSE's and Mr. COLLINS' report. He thinks they did an outstanding job of analyzing the key issues dividing the two parties, and is most grateful, as he believes the Nation is, for their efforts.

At this particular moment it is now a matter between the parties themselves, with representation on the Federal Government's part coming through the two Secretaries.

Question. How long do you think these meetings will last?

Mr. MOYERS. It is the President's hope that they will continue to bargain until a settlement is reached.

Question. Bargain here rather than bargain in Pittsburgh?

Mr. MOYERS. They will remain here.

Question. Senator MORSE, Bill, this morning—at least on the basis of what I heard on the radio—was quite critical of both parties in a statement that he made before he left Pittsburgh. I wondered whether his view is

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lation is in the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, where Congressman PELL, a member, is seeking to line up support.

Second, an attempt must be made to better acquaint the decisionmaking scientific and administrative officials with Seattle's potential as a marine research center.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, the editorial points out the strong necessity for the Government to devote more attention to the correlation and coordination of a program of oceanography within the Government departments.

Oceanography has now spread into 21 Government departments. An inter-agency committee and other groups are trying to get together to correlate this problem.

In my opinion, the whole matter must receive at least now, so that the future will be assured, the same treatment we gave the space effort, in which we finally established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

We are trying to correlate the activities which now exist in Government in order to obtain some decent, broad knowledge 10 to 15 years from now, for the future. No one knows better than I, the distinguished occupant of the chair, the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND] and other Senators now in the Chamber, who have been deeply interested in this matter, the prime importance of exerting more effort toward discovering the secrets of this great untapped three-quarters of the earth's surface.

As fine as the space effort is—and we all approve of it and heartily congratulate everyone concerned with it—we should also be thinking about the watery three-quarters of the earth's surface.

It has been stated many times by scientists, including space scientists, that we know more about the back side of the moon than we do about the wet three-quarters of the earth's surface. This is of great importance, of course, in the future production of food and discovery of minerals, and forecasting of the weather—but of prime importance is the subject of defense.

The editorial points out the necessity of making this effort. I am an author of a bill which has been introduced along this line, and has passed the Senate; and I hope that action will be taken on it soon.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. I commend the Senator from Washington for bringing up this subject. As he knows, I have been greatly interested in obtaining greater knowledge of the oceans, what lies beneath them, and how better to use the great assets which lie there.

Yesterday, I know that he was pleased, as I was pleased, to hear that while the entire Nation was listening to radio and television primarily directed to the feats of our astronauts, those who are working with our aquanauts were also mentioned. Their efforts were brought into the same reports on the astronauts, which I thought was an excellent thing to do, and I commend them for that.

We must all realize that while it is more spectacular to read about the ex-

ploration of space and the stars, it may be even more practical and more necessary to us, living as we do upon the surface of the earth, to know what is available to us which we can utilize, or which we can guard against if we must, in connection with the untouched treasures which lie beneath the surface of the oceans.

I commend the Senator from Washington for his continued effort in this direction.

Mr. MAGNUSON. I thank the Senator for his comments.

THE CHALLENGE OF VIETNAM

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, on Saturday, August 21, my colleague, Mr. JACKSON, addressed the National Security Commission of the American Legion at the Legion's National Convention in Portland, Oreg. His subject was "The Challenge of Vietnam."

I believe that my colleague's illuminating and forward-looking address will be of great interest to Members of the Senate and House.

I ask unanimous consent to have the text of his address printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE CHALLENGE OF VIETNAM

(Address by Senator HENRY M. JACKSON to the national security commission of the American Legion, 1965 American Legion National Convention, Portland, Oreg., Saturday, August 21, 1965)

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to address you this morning. I do not know any group before which it is more appropriate to discuss issues affecting the safety of our Nation and the future of individual liberty.

During the 20 years beginning in 1946 the United States will have spent approximately \$770 billion for national defense and about \$80 billion for economic aid and other international programs. Millions of American man-years have been devoted to national security purposes, directly in the military, foreign, and civil services and indirectly in production for defense and foreign aid. In addition, the Nation as a whole has had to carry the psychological burdens of coping with the problems of national security in a dangerous world—and as the teach-ins and demonstrations show, some Americans find it difficult to face the hard realities of our times.

With all this effort, a genuine peace may be no farther away than it was in 1946 but it does not seem measurably closer. In some ways, the prospects, especially in the Far East, are darker. So it behooves us not to be complacent, not to assume that we have found the right answers, and not to shrink from tough-minded review of our national security policies.

In the 1930's facing Nazi Germany, the Western Powers tried to escape involvement in the struggle. France built the Maginot line; America built its hiding place of ideas and called it isolationism. The British called their appeasement. None of them worked, for Hitler's ambitions required the destruction of the power of the Western democracies.

In retrospect, it was a mistake to procrastinate during the thirties. If we had it to do over, knowing what we know, we would surely stop Hitler early, not later than when he reentered the Rhineland in 1936. It is now evident from German documents that had Hitler's march into the Rhineland been

used as the occasion for allied intervention, the dictator almost certainly would not have survived the fiasco. Hitler himself admitted as much. "A retreat on our part," he conceded later, "would have spelled collapse."

The present struggle to counter the expansionist thrusts of the Communist powers will not be won if South Vietnam is successfully defended, nor will it be lost if South Vietnam falls. But here as elsewhere the old adage applies—a stitch in time saves nine. It is better to win than lose a battle, for each successful stand makes the next one easier and each defeat increases the enemy's confidence and momentum.

In the early postwar years Stalin expected to make quick and easy gains in Western Europe. But, as he found out, Western Europe was a place in which we could bring our power to bear effectively. There the state structures and national sentiments and traditions were strong. The Marshall Plan and NATO helped Western Europe to recover strength and confidence. The Soviet Union found itself frustrated—and shifted its attention to other areas. It began to exploit the potential of unconventional warfare in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where poverty, political immaturity, and memories of colonialism could be fanned into revolutionary flames. Furthermore, as it happens, many of these countries are tropical, remote, and just plain difficult for us to operate in from a purely physical standpoint.

But if we cannot make a stand in such places, then we will have to get out of the competition. For Moscow and Peking are not likely to challenge us on ground favorable to us, but only where the odds are in their favor.

Someone has said that candor is the most effective form of deception in international relations. Certainly Adolf Hitler announced to the world what he was going to do and then proceeded to do it—or rather he tried and failed by a margin that was all too slender.

In 1937 Mao Tse-tung advertised the strategy by which he was eventually to come to power:

"In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stranger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted, and annihilated."

In 1961 the 22d Communist Congress adopted a 20-year program for Communist strategy and formally approved what was called "antimperialist national-liberation revolutions."

The so-called war of national liberation is a fancy name for subversion and for the use of an armed minority to subjugate a nation. It is how the attempt was made in Greece, Czechoslovakia, Malaya, and elsewhere, sometimes with success, sometimes not. It is how the attempt is being made today in Vietnam; an armed minority, the Vietcong, controlled and increasingly supported by Hanoi and incited by Communist China, is seeking to impose its will on South Vietnam by the use of force, including terror.

The Russians and the Chinese may not see eye to eye on when and where and how much violence should be used in overthrowing non-Communist governments. I think they do not agree about everything related to the waging of the Vietnamese struggle. But the Sino-Soviet quarrel is a family quarrel, and the arguments between them are over means, not ends. Both are wholehearted supporters of "wars of national liberation." Both are

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supporting the war in Vietnam—with resources, with diplomacy, and with propaganda. If it came to a major showdown with the Chinese, we cannot assume that the Russians would not come to their support. And while we should take such advantage of their quarrel as we can, the only sure guide to our policy is to do what we must do to defend our interests. We will only confuse and mislead ourselves if we look for their differences to give us an easy way out.

When trouble looms at any point around the world, it is important to estimate quickly and accurately what our national interest requires. Obviously, the United States cannot take responsibility for every uprising or revolt—and should not, if it could, for, as we should know better than most, revolution is not always a dirty word.

Moreover, even if the revolution is Communist-led, neither we nor anyone else can save the threatened country unless the country wants to save itself. In Malaya the British helped to defeat the Communist uprising by wise policies and plans that made military action an integral part of social and economic action. In the Philippines we helped to defeat the Communist Hukks chiefly by timely economic and moral support of Magsaysay, not by contributing military forces, and it was Magsaysay's shrewd combination of political, social, and economic reforms, together with effective military measures, that carried the day. In these struggles, and in Greece, the governments in power wanted to overcome the threat and because they saw the problem as a whole and adopted appropriate programs, they gained and held the support of the people and won the day.

In South Vietnam we are dealing with a truncated country, just lately under colonial rule. It has never been a nation and national sentiment is weak or nonexistent. The country is split religiously. It has never known good government—only recently gangster sects ruled the rivers and canals like pirates, and controlled Saigon in Al Capone style. With our help South Vietnam is trying to build its national home, but it must collect the materials, build the house, live in it, and defend it against attack, all at the same time. And it is not surprising that the task is difficult—and discouraging.

Vietnam is not the only country where national structures and traditions are weak, thus inviting Communist subversion. Unfortunately, there are other countries, in southeast Asia and elsewhere, which may invite and receive their deadly attention. Clearly, we and our friends in other free and favored societies still have a great deal to learn about helping others to help themselves to create societies resistant to the virus of communism. Even in the military field we are still far short of giving our men the kind of training they need to wage warfare against guerrillas or to train others to wage such struggles.

Although the so-called war of national liberation is fundamentally a political struggle, at any particular time and place the military phase of the struggle may be decisive. The fact that widespread guerrilla war broke out in Vietnam is evidence that South Vietnam was not a healthy society. Politically, economically, psychologically, and militarily, conditions developed which made South Vietnam ripe for Communist exploitation and violence. But this war having broken out, a precondition to the restoration of law and order and the improvement of conditions in the country is the military defeat of the Vietcong. The same was true in Greece, in Malaya, and in the Philippines.

The present struggle in Vietnam would be easier to win were the internal political situation good. It may yet be lost because of a political collapse which would bring to power a government that would seek peace at any

price. We must do what we can to improve the political climate. The point I wish to make, however, is that there is a direct relation between the decline in the political situation and the deterioration in the military situation—and nothing will so transform the politics of South Vietnam as a string of military successes.

As for American policy, we can be grateful for the way President Johnson is demonstrating a cool and resolute determination to block the Communist effort to subjugate all of Vietnam. His determination is backed by the firm will of the American people.

We are committed to do what must be done to help the people of South Vietnam defend their freedom. The commitment will require us to do more than we have done or have yet been asked to do.

We need to face up to five important questions:

1. If the deterioration in South Vietnam is to be reversed, what additional military effort is required? I have argued that no real headway is going to be made in political affairs until and unless there is a military turnaround, and the question is, What is needed to produce such a turnaround? Should we put in more men and equipment, faster? How long should we wait before making the shoe pinch in North Vietnam by destroying key economic installations there? To do too little, too slow, may be the most costly way of bringing about a substantial improvement in the military situation.

2. Are we conducting our policy in Vietnam as well as we can with a view to persuading other countries to share in the defense of Vietnam—a defense which affects their vital interests? Australia and New Zealand have sent combat forces, and the Republic of Korea has voted to send one combat division. Other governments might well ponder the question whether they, were they to find themselves under similar attack, would wish to receive outside help and if so, whether it might not be in their own enlightened interests to help put down this flagrant act of aggression.

3. I support the President in his willingness to discuss a peaceful settlement of the issues in Vietnam. But I hope that we have learned the lesson of the negotiations for an armistice in Korea, and will not again call off our military operations as soon as the other side requests negotiations.

In Korea we gave the Chinese a respite; they took advantage of it to build a strong defensive line, 14 miles deep, and once they had it built, they knew we could renew hostilities only at the cost of heavy casualties. Then, with their defenses secure, the Communists proceeded to drag out the negotiations for more than 2 years, trying to win at the negotiating table far more than they had been able to win on the field of battle.

The moral of the Korean story is plain. Negotiation is not a substitute for pressure. On the contrary, pressure is a part of the negotiating process. It is an old rule that a diplomat cannot be expected to win more at the conference table than his comrade at arms has won—or is clearly in a position to win—on the battlefield.

But do we understand the relevance of this principle in Vietnam? Will we again accept truce talks without a time limit and without keeping up our military pressure, ignoring the fact that it is the pressure outside the conference room that largely determines whether a negotiation can be brought to a satisfactory conclusion?

4. Will this country do what is necessary to maintain our central Reserve forces and our forces throughout the world at a size and readiness to meet contingencies that could arise elsewhere? Thanks to the substantial buildup—initiated by President Kennedy and followed up on by President Johnson—our conventional forces are larger, harder hitting, more mobile, and in a better

state of readiness than ever before in peacetime. But new troubles may erupt outside southeast Asia, possibly as a reaction to our effort in Vietnam, or for other reasons. And we might expose ourselves to serious risks if we continue to support the effort in Vietnam by drawing men and material from our forces in other areas. Prudence requires preparation for such outbreaks—in the form of larger Ready Reserve forces—for that is the best way to discourage the enemy from making trouble.

5. Will we, working so far as possible with our allies, find the means and the will to do those important but often undramatic things that are needed to prevent the emergence of new Vietnams in the future? Somehow or other, the free societies have got to persuade the Communists that "wars of national liberation" are unprofitable. Of course, the first essential is to bring Peiping and Moscow to an understanding of this by a successful defense of Vietnam. But beyond that we must find better ways to encourage the kind of healthy societies that do not tempt the Communists to launch such aggression—and that probably means a combination of programs, mainly nonmilitary, that take time and patience and skill.

In conclusion, let me add this cautionary note:

In the kind of longrun struggle in which we are engaged, there is a constant temptation, whenever the clouds seem to lift a bit, to see a silver lining. If we look back at the pronouncements in recent years made by those in positions of responsibility about the military requirements and prospects in Vietnam, we must note in candor that the record is one of successive misjudgments, rosy estimates, and, to be generous, clouded crystal ball.

It is wrong to cry "Wolf, wolf." But it is equally wrong to predict that victory lies just around the corner when it doesn't, when, in fact, there isn't even a corner visible down the road. To arouse great but unjustified expectations may quiet a few critics today, but it will only sharpen their doubts and disillusion tomorrow. The willingness of Government officials to speak frankly about conditions and policies and requirements is a necessary foundation of public confidence and therefore of the kind of constructive public debate which can lead to action adequate to the hard demands of the times.

LOS ANGELES RIOTS

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, the August 19 issue of the *Shreveport Times* published an excellent article written by James Jackson Kilpatrick on the riots and looting which recently took place in Los Angeles.

Mr. Kilpatrick very ably discusses the question of responsibility for this outrageous sequence of events. I am persuaded that the sort of thing that happened in Los Angeles will happen again and again in this country if we do not change our present approach to the question of civil rights and individual responsibility for unlawful acts.

I ask unanimous consent to have Mr. Kilpatrick's article printed in the *Record*.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the *Record*, as follows:

NEGRO WAR RESULTS FROM BLAMING OTHERS
FOR HIS FAILINGS

(By James Jackson Kilpatrick)

All week long, the leading bleeding hearts of the Great Society have been wetting down the ashes of Los Angeles with tears for the poor oppressed. We have been fairly awash

August 30, 1965

AUGUST 19, 1965.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In the era of the Great Society there is a problem which cries out for your attention—that is, the pollution of the airways with the noise from jet planes. Jet noise affects the daily lives of those living in and around the periphery of the more than 100 jetports in the United States; and as small jet aircraft is developed, millions of people living around our airports will become equally affected.

I have lived in the shadow of Kennedy International Airport these past 18 years and, accordingly, I speak from personal experience. Since the coming of the jet planes, my family life and the family lives of all the residents on the periphery of this multiple-landing-strip airport have been seriously disturbed and disrupted. No longer is it possible for us to enjoy the full use of our property. Telephone service is disrupted; television reception is interfered with; and even away from our homes, all our services on Saturdays and Sundays, wedding ceremonies and funerals, are disturbed.

Since I have come to Congress in January and because of the seriousness of this problem to my constituents, and all those who reside in neighboring districts bordering on Kennedy Airport, I have proposed legislation calling for increased research in an effort to find a solution to the problem of jet noise. I have also introduced legislation to protect against the expansion of the problem by providing assistance for proper land use studies and buffer zones in connection with the establishment of new airports, as well as, around the existing airports.

Mr. President, we now have over 100 jet airports in our Nation. Airports, located in every one of the 50 States, now have facilities to accommodate jet aircraft, and therefore, the lives of a great many of our citizens are affected by the problem. This is not a local problem.

Mr. President, the answer to the aircraft noise problem will come only when you, from your high position, recognize it as national in scope and consider the appointment of a commission to examine it in depth and propose solutions to the Congress. As an American I cannot accept the statement that "there is no solution." A nation which can send a spacecraft to explore the planet Mars surely can find the answer to this problem.

Mr. President, deafening noise is as much a "pollution of the air" as chemicals and fumes. In the ear of the Great Society we must protect the health and lives of all of our citizens, equally affected by such contamination. The air we breathe and the noise we hear affect young and old alike—the poor and the rich in all walks of life—of all political persuasions—surely it is a problem national in scope.

I respectfully request your consideration of this far-reaching problem.

Very respectfully,

HERBERT TENZER,
Member of Congress.

The above letter was hand delivered to the White House. On August 19, the following telegram was received from the White House in answer to the above letter:

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, D.C., August 19, 1965.

HON. HERBERT TENZER,
Lawrence, Long Island, N.Y.:

The problem of aircraft noise is one which deserves our serious consideration. Your suggestion of a Presidential conference on the subject is under consideration in my office in connection with studies presently underway

as discussed with you by Dr. MacLeod. Be assured the problem is receiving our continuing attention.

DONALD F. HORNING,
Special Assistant for
Science and Technology.

I respectfully urge all my colleagues in the House of Representatives to support my proposal for a Presidential Commission and for congressional hearings on H.R. 2086, H.R. 7981, H.R. 7982, and related bills dealing with the subject of jet noise abatement.

U.S. Goals in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 30, 1965

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, there can be no confusion or misunderstanding about the purposes and objectives of U.S. policy in Vietnam. These have been made abundantly clear by the President and by those responsible for conducting our foreign affairs.

Speaking informally, the President has stated that the United States must demonstrate the integrity of its commitment to South Vietnam. This commitment was undertaken by our treaty obligations by bilateral agreements made by President Eisenhower, and by the promises of three Presidents. To uphold the honor of this Nation and to insure world peace by standing firm against aggression, we are following the only possible course in Vietnam.

In conjunction with our opposition to aggression, we are seeking a peaceful settlement of this conflict. Our willingness to negotiate was reiterated by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on a CBS television program. Secretary Rusk reminded the Communists that it was the aggression by northern forces against South Vietnam that precipitated this struggle. Despite no indication of the withdrawal of these forces, we are prepared to seek a peaceful solution.

I commend to the attention of our colleagues the following articles from the August 30, 1965, edition of the New York Herald Tribune.

The first article, by Roscoe Drummond, concerns the President's definition of our commitment in South Vietnam. The second article, by David Lawrence, deals with Secretary Rusk's statement of our offer for a peaceful settlement.

The articles follow:

THE MEANING OF HONOR: THE PRESIDENT TELLS WHY WE ARE FIGHTING IN VIETNAM
(By Roscoe Drummond)

WASHINGTON.—There are some questions only the President of the United States can answer. It is his constitutional duty to conduct foreign relations. He alone is Commander in Chief.

Many Americans still have nagging questions about why we are in Vietnam. The President's most effective answers often come when he is speaking informally and spontaneously—rather than in his set speeches.

This column reports the President speaking informally and spontaneously on questions which concern the safety of the United States and the peace of the world—and gives his candid and innermost thinking.

Question: Was there no other choice but to defend South Vietnam?

President Johnson: "You know the major alternatives as well as I do and I won't take time to repeat them. You can think of a thousands problems, a thousand complications, about this ball of wax out there in southeast Asia. We have to confront this utter complexity and find a few simple, fundamental propositions on which this Nation moves.

"And what are those simple propositions? One, the fact of aggression. Can the thousands of armed men and large quantities of arms sent down from North Vietnam to South Vietnam take over that country by force? If you don't believe this is really aggression, go see Bob McNamara or Dean Rusk and let them show you the complete evidence."

Question: Do we really have a commitment to South Vietnam?

President Johnson: "I'm not going to take the case to the Supreme Court as to whether we were legally compelled to come to her defense. Our commitment was voluntarily and deliberately entered into on the basis of the SEATO treaty, on the basis of the bilateral arrangements made by President Eisenhower with the Government of South Vietnam, on the basis of annual appropriations thoroughly discussed with the Congress for aid in both the economic and political affairs of South Vietnam for 10 years, on the basis of the commitment of three Presidents—we have a commitment.

"We know we have it. The South Vietnamese know we have it. The Communists know we have it. So, if anyone doubts we have a commitment, let them look at the facts."

Question: What does that commitment mean?

President Johnson: "What does it mean? If I can leave you with one thought I would say that you must understand that the integrity of the American commitment is the principal pillar of peace in the world today. If anything happens to the integrity of that commitment, we are lost.

"I have used the word 'honor' with respect to Vietnam. When I have done so, some have tended to say, 'Oh, dear me!' As if this were an expression out of 18th century diplomacy—for a king who had become offended because his daughter was refused in marriage to the son of another king."

Question: What do you mean by "honor"?

President Johnson: "Let me tell you what honor means—concretely. Toward the end of President Eisenhower's administration, he was presented by Chairman Khrushchev with an ultimatum: 6 months in Berlin and out. And President Eisenhower said to Chairman Khrushchev: 'No, Mr. Chairman, you can't do that to the United States.' And Khrushchev had to believe it.

"In the summer of 1961, Khrushchev said to President Kennedy: 'Out of Berlin, or there will be war.' This was at the Vienna talks in June 1961. President Kennedy looked him straight in the eye and said, 'Mr. Chairman, if that is what you want, that is what you will have. It will be a cold winter.' And it was utterly to the life of this Nation that Mr. Khrushchev believed that.

"When the Russian missiles entered Cuba, President Kennedy had to say to Mr. Khrushchev, 'Mr. Chairman, these missiles have to go. Period. Paragraph. They have got to go. And you have a chance to get them out peacefully, but they have got to go.' The life of this Nation depended at that moment on Mr. Khrushchev believing him.

"We are now saying to Hanoi and Peiping 'Gentlemen, you are not going to take over

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South Vietnam. You're not going to do it," "If you were a Berliner, if you were a Thai, you would be living on the basis of the American commitment. If Moscow or Peiping or Hanoi ever thought that commitment was not worth anything, then no one is in more danger than you and I in this room. The entire Nation is in danger.

"That is what honor means in this situation. It takes guts. You have the life of nations wrapped up in this word."

This is what the integrity of America's commitment to South Vietnam means to the President of the United States.

TODAY IN WORLD AFFAIRS: U.S. PEACE OFFER IS NOW CLEAR TO REDS
(By David Lawrence)

WASHINGTON.—By this time, the Governments of Red China and the Soviet Union have had several days in which to analyze a document containing a comprehensive exposition of the American Government's intentions with respect to peace in Vietnam. If the Communist regimes don't take advantage of the olive branch being offered them, it must be surmised that they are still unaware that, by prolonging the war, they inevitably will risk the devastation of Hanoi by air bombardment and the demoralization of the North Vietnam Government.

There has just been an outpouring of nearly 40,000 words by officials of the U.S. Government and a Republican committee, as well as a State Department news conference, covering every phase of the delicate problem in Vietnam. But the hour-long television program over the CBS network really built the foundations for a peace negotiation—if the Communists are seriously interested.

Not only did Secretary of State Dean Rusk, U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, and Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy express themselves freely, but the three CBS reporters—Richard C. Hottel, Marvin Kalb, and Harry Reasoner—all asked pointed questions and got some forceful answers, even though the latter were couched occasionally in diplomatic jargon.

The television audience as a whole may not have grasped the true significance of what was being said, and perhaps it wasn't expected to, as the real audience was far away in other lands. There's little doubt that the foreign offices in Peking and Moscow, to whom verbatim transcripts were available through embassies here, can read between the lines and perceive that there's a chance to make peace now without much complication and that there may be greater difficulty later on if the war is prolonged.

Emphasis was placed, of course, on America's readiness to negotiate, and the point was made that the military successes in recent days might "help us bring nearer the day when there would be effective negotiations." But the heart of the argument was the indicated formula as to how peace could be made. Secretary Rusk recalled that the Chinese had been talking about an immediate withdrawal of American forces as a precondition to negotiations, and described this as "quite an unrealistic point of view," because the intervention of American forces in the first place was due entirely to the invasion from the north into South Vietnam. Secretary Rusk added:

"Now one would suppose that peace requires that there be a withdrawal of those North Vietnamese forces that have penetrated into South Vietnam. If you don't like the word withdrawal, you can use the word redeployment, but it is that infiltration which is solely responsible for the presence of American combat forces in South Vietnam."

Secretary Rusk reiterated that the United States has "no interest in military bases or a permanent military presence in southeast

Asia." He was unequivocal in his statement that there is a "deep commitment to the simple notion of self-determination."

There were questions asked as to whether the United States is interested in pursuing the war into Red China's territory, and this was vigorously denied. Secretary Rusk stressed, moreover, that the United States does not want to escalate the war. He said: "We would hope very much that the time will come when it will be recognized on the other side that pushing this matter militarily is not worth the risk at the end of the trail, and therefore that they will bring this to the conference table for settlement. * * *

"I myself cannot believe that it is a rational idea that the principal powers involved in this business could look with favor upon the outbreak of a general war. It doesn't make sense from anyone's point of view."

Mr. Rusk didn't speak of the Red Chinese as "enemies" but referred to "our colleagues in Peiping" as he said:

"If they want to test whether or not the United States is aggressive, then let them live at peace with their neighbors and they would find out that the United States is not aggressive with respect to mainland China."

The whole discussion shows clearly to Peiping that there is a way to make peace. It adds up to a willingness by the United States to refrain from bombing North Vietnam provided there is an indication of a withdrawal of Communist forces back to North Vietnam. This then could lead to a cease-fire, and talks could proceed indefinitely on other points at issue.

Congressman Culver Helps Iowa Farmers

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. BERT BANDSTRA

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 26, 1965

Mr. BANDSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I feel it is good when steps are taken to build stronger ties among rural and urban sections of the country. I would like to call to the attention of my fellow Members an article from the August 20, 1965 issue of the Des Moines Register describing the visit of three eastern Congressmen to northeast Iowa at the invitation of our colleague JOHN CULVER, who represents the second district of Iowa.

Congressman CULVER arranged the trip to show the metropolitan Representatives JOHN MURPHY of New York, THOMAS McGRATH of New Jersey, and WILLIAM GREEN of Philadelphia, the problems of Iowa farmers and the importance of a good farm program.

On this occasion the Congressmen visited several farms near Olin in Jones County where they had the opportunity to view the methods, equipment, and conservation practices of modern agriculture, and to frankly discuss current farm problems. Additionally, they attended a county fair in Decorah and a farm meeting in Independence, toured plants in Cedar Rapids, and were shown historical points of interest and tourist facilities in Dubuque, McGregor, Marquette, Spillville, and Fort Atkinson.

As the Representative of Iowa's Fourth District, and a member of the

House Agriculture Committee, I share JOHN CULVER's conviction that we can gain increased support for our State and greater interest in its growth through this type of first-hand view of our farms and factories.

It is clear from the article that this visit was extremely successful in promoting better mutual understanding. It is also significant that the trip was sponsored by CULVER's Agricultural Advisory Committee which represents all farm organizations in an effort to find and further those areas of agreement which are commonly shared by all farm interests.

I want to commend JOHN CULVER for his efforts, and my three eastern colleagues for their desire to learn more about the people and problems of the Midwest to assist them in effectively serving the national interest in Congress.

The article from the Des Moines Register follows:

THREE BIG CITY LAWMAKERS VISIT FARMS
(By Gene Raffensperger)

OLIN, IOWA.—"I'm going to let my hair down with you fellows," said Dillon Storey, 58, a Jones County farmer, as he talked Friday in his farm yard with three eastern big city Congressmen.

Storey, a member of the Farmers Union and the National Farmers Organization, told the visiting Congressmen that his gross income in 1964 was \$30,965 but that expenses, taxes, and other operating costs, left him with a net loss of \$420.39.

He detailed the plight of some farmers in terms of parity price, said hog and cattle prices currently promise a better year for farmers, and said the feed grain legislation had given him some important income.

Representative JOHN MURPHY, Democrat, of New York, whose district includes Brooklyn and Staten Island, told Storey, "We don't get that same picture portrayed to us most of the time from the Agricultural Department. I guess we hear more from the big producers and the meatpackers."

MURPHY and his eastern colleagues didn't hear much from the big producers Friday. They heard mostly from Iowa farmers operating family farms.

WITH CULVER

MURPHY, Representative THOMAS McGRATH, Democrat, of New Jersey, and Representative WILLIAM GREEN, Democrat, of Pennsylvania, were in Iowa with Representative JOHN CULVER, Democrat, of Iowa, who represents the district that includes Jones County.

CULVER said he asked the eastern Congressmen to come here to learn first hand the problems faced by farmers in the hope that through mutual understanding the two sections of the country both would benefit.

MURPHY, 39, represents a metropolitan section of New York. Green, 27, represents a section of Philadelphia. McGrath, 38, represents Atlantic City and the South Jersey shore area.

None had been on a Midwest farm before Friday. Green cheerfully admitted he had not been "west of Pittsburgh."

The four Congressmen were in the House Chamber in Washington, D.C., until 8 p.m., Thursday to vote in favor of the administration's farm bill. Seven hours later, after flying and driving all right, all were bedded down in Iowa farm homes in Jones County.

McGrath who stayed at the farm home of Glenn Brown, southwest of Olin, was up at 6:30 a.m., after 3 hours sleep. Wearing a white shirt and tie, he donned a borrowed set of coveralls and rubber boots and set out with Brown on "chore time."

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even if it does not wish to do so, its position in the Fund to be reconstituted at the discretion of the Fund through drawings of its currency by other countries.

(vi) The amendment of the Articles of Agreement, which is required in several schemes, would open the door to further, unpredictable and possibly undesirable modifications of the rules governing the Fund.

(vii) In the particular case of substitution of gold certificates for gold on the occasion of quota increases, the principal deterrent to unjustified requests for larger quotas by countries permanently in a weak external position would disappear. Moreover, there would be little flexibility to respond to overall needs as increases could only be decided at the time of quota increases.

Paragraph 125: Counter-arguments, some of which were supported by all other members of the Study Group, were presented as follows:

(i) In general, the Fund's prestige and experience as a monetary institution make it the natural center for new functions involving deliberate creation of reserve assets and provide assurance of its capacity to conduct, and keep distinct, conditional lending and deliberate reserve creation. It was felt that it would be unfortunate and confusing to establish a rival center of decision in the international monetary field. Given the desirability of maintaining a proper balance between the extension of credit facilities and the creation of reserve assets, it would be more appropriate to combine these functions in one institution. It should be noted that any scheme of deliberate reserve creation, whether in the Fund or otherwise, would tend to make countries less dependent on credit facilities and on the conditions attaching to them.

(ii) As regards the decision-making process, the weighted voting system has operated effectively, generally reflecting the relative economic weight and international responsibility of the participants, and giving the countries of the Group of Ten a decisive influence on Fund policymaking. Furthermore, the voting power of individual countries or groups of countries may be altered, for instance, by selective adjustments of quotas, to reflect changes over time in relative economic weight and responsibility. In addition, special decision rules may be envisaged to govern the operation of particular methods of creating reserve assets through the Fund.

(iii) Most schemes for deliberate reserve creation through the Fund incorporate a self-qualifying element, which would exclude countries in persistent deficit while allowing countries with good balance of payments performance, now or in the future, to share in reserve creation; other qualifying criteria—for example, that the country's currency has been used in drawings—would permit a more selective but still open grouping. In response to the argument that countries with a favorable balance-of-payments record would have little interest in an increase in reserve assets in the form of automatic drawing rights in the Fund, it was stated that this consideration applied with equal strength to the attitude of such countries to any form of addition to their reserves. As to the benefit that is said to accrue to countries that are at first excluded under the self-qualifying element and later repay their debt to the Fund, this mitigation of a debt burden is no different from what would be experienced by debtor countries which received new reserve assets under any reserve creation scheme, except that, under the self-qualifying element in the Fund, the benefit is not gained until the debt is actually repaid.

(iv) It was pointed out that not all Fund schemes would require an amendment of the Articles of Agreement; in any event, proposals outside the Fund would require national legislation. It was also observed that the criti-

cism of particular Fund schemes—for example, that referred to in paragraph 124 (vii)—are not arguments against centering deliberate reserve creation in the Fund but against particular methods of doing so.

(v) The gold tranche is increasingly recognized as a reserve asset which countries can use without reluctance and virtually at will to meet a balance-of-payments need; new types of claim on the Fund could be used with equal facility. Furthermore, a repayment obligation, such as that now attaching to regular gold tranche drawings, is not different in kind from the normal expectation that a reserve loss will be reconstituted. Finally, the process of reconstituting a country's reserve position in the Fund through drawings of its currency by others is no different in substance from the direct transfer of any reserve asset to one country from another.

Rules of Decisionmaking

Paragraph 126: Deliberate multilateral creation of reserve assets would be an entirely new activity, entailing issues of great significance to the world economy. Under most proposals, decisions would be required, at a minimum, as to the circumstances in which the reserves should be created and as to the amount to be created. Since differences of attitude and policy among the participants would be inevitable in the application of any of the proposals that have been considered, great importance attaches to the means of resolving differences.

Paragraph 127: Objective formulae and agreed rules are helpful in minimizing the need for decisions. But any scheme would have to be applied to varying circumstances and in changing conditions and would call for decisions on both policy and administration. While no voting system will work smoothly where there are deep underlying divisions of view, it is recognized that a viable decisionmaking process is a prerequisite to the successful operation of any reserve creation scheme. The group considered four general rules of decisionmaking that have been used in international organizations:

Unanimity: The proponents of this principle consider that it is the only workable process for as fundamental an operation as deliberate creation of reserves and that it offers some protection against international inflation. They consider that the rule, which they regard as an essential safeguard of their monetary autonomy, should be workable in a limited and homogeneous group of countries capable of reaching compromise, and cite examples, e.g., EPU. The opposite view, however, is that differences of opinion on policy and operation are inevitable and that, as a result of the unanimity requirement, action could not be taken without the agreement of the group's most reluctant member. The result would be a failure to take action, and hence too restrictive an approach to future needs for reserves.

Unit voting with ordinary majority: In general, our members did not believe that this method of voting should be relied upon for decisionmaking, some because of the advantages they saw in unanimity and others because of their preference for weighted voting. However, in a variant of one of the schemes before us, this method was mentioned as a possibility within a limited and homogeneous group of countries (par. 55).

Weighted voting with ordinary majority: This is the rule in the Fund for most types of decisions, and is implicit in the proposals for creating reserves through the Fund, as described in chapter III. It could also be applied to a limited group within the Fund. The supporters of this procedure assert that it is now familiar and has been used successfully to govern the operations of the Fund. This thoroughly tested system represents a satisfactory compromise between unanimity, which risks an impasse, and simple majority voting, which risks unsound de-

cisions. Moreover, they point out that the industrial members of the Fund have a decisive voice in the decisions taken under this procedure. Other members point out that there has been criticism of individual decisions reached under this system. Decisions on deliberate reserve creation would involve more fundamental issues, and divergences of views could be sharper. To try to settle the issues by majority voting, and especially by a weighted majority which overruled a substantial minority, could expose the system to severe strain.

Special majority—i.e., greater than an ordinary majority: This could be applied both to unit voting and weighted voting. It is used in the Fund in conjunction with weighted voting for certain important decisions, and in the GAB.

Paragraph 128: Selection between these alternatives is much more than a technical matter. The economic impact of any scheme can be greatly influenced by the rules adopted for arriving at decisions.

Paragraph 129: Some members were of the opinion that it is not possible to judge the relative merits of the various types of decisionmaking rule independently of the specific institutional and operational framework in which they would be designed to operate. In their view, the aim of providing maximum safeguards for sound decisions, avoiding, on the one hand, extreme rigidity and, on the other, the possibility of misuse, could—depending on the specific procedures and process of decisionmaking—conceivably be achieved by any one of the above-mentioned types or a combination of them. In this context, they referred, by way of example, to the variety of voting types in the EEC Treaty.

DECISIVE STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM: HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE VIETNAMESE

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, last Thursday the distinguished senior senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] delivered a speech on Vietnam which should have a wide audience in this country and the Nation.

Senator JAVITS discussed the nonmilitary war the fight for economic, educational, social advance in Vietnam, in a word the struggle for men's minds.

Senator JAVITS called for a more intensive effort in this regard; but it is most significant that the New York Senator stressed the little reported but very big effort we are making in this regard right now.

Mr. President, in my judgment, this economic-educational effort we are making in South Vietnam is superlative, but it is not spectacular. It does not lend itself to headlines or dramatic TV reporting. Few Americans know about it.

I am delighted that the senior senator from New York has given it his attention in his fine speech.

In this connection, Mr. President, James Reston of the New York Times has been sending dispatches back to this country that show that we are not going to win unless we somehow solve the tough problem of winning the support of the heart—from peasants in villages and hamlets throughout Vietnam.

First the Reston dispatches establish the reasons why this is likely to be a long war. And in such a war the capacity to win and hold the allegiance of the people of South Vietnam will be essential.

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Distribution of newly created reserve assets in proportion to countries' gold holdings would, because of differing policies on the composition of reserves, be inequitable, penalizing those countries which, as a matter of policy, maintain a low ratio of gold to total reserves. In order to benefit from a greater share of new assets created, monetary authorities would feel an incentive to maximize their gold holdings by converting reserve currency assets into gold. Moreover, the consequent reduction in the gold reserves of the United States might cause anxieties to monetary authorities outside the group of participating countries and lead them also to convert reserve currencies into gold. The result would be a shrinkage of total reserve assets (at least in their present form) and therefore a potential threat to the stability of the system as a whole. The impact would fall mainly on U.S. reserves; yet, even if new assets were created, and distributed in proportion to gold holdings, in an amount equivalent to the shrinkage of reserve currency assets, only 40 percent of the drop in U.S. reserves would be compensated, since the United States holds only 40 percent of the group's total gold stock. It may be noted that substitution of gold for reserve currencies resulting in an increase of only 1 percentage point in the average ratio of gold to total official reserve outside the United States would mean the disappearance of about \$500 mn. of reserve assets (of which about \$275 mn. in the group), an amount not far from the annual addition to monetary gold stocks in recent years.

Even if distribution were not based on gold holdings, a close link to gold in the use of new reserve assets would encourage countries within the group to hold a higher ratio of gold to total reserves, since the use of the new assets would (unlike other new assets not closely linked with gold) entail sizable gold movements in the financing of international imbalances. Countries outside the group might feel impelled to increase their gold ratios also. Sizable gold movements could be damaging to confidence and could, in any case, lead countries to adopt excessively harsh policies in order to avoid deficits and a resultant loss of gold. This tendency toward restrictive policies would be accentuated as the result of conversions of currency assets into gold, with further harmful effects on international trade and economic growth.

Finally, these members also questioned whether the operations of the Fund, being necessarily based on the use of currencies, would not be impeded in a gold-dominated system through fears of Fund members that their currencies, when drawn and put into circulation, would have to be redeemed by them in gold.

Paragraph 118: (1) Width of management group.—So far as management is concerned, it is argued in favor of a limited group that the formation of judgments on the operation and liquidity of the international monetary system would be a highly important, but difficult, process which would only be likely to succeed in practice within a group of limited size and homogeneous composition. The needs of the larger industrialized countries which share the responsibility for the working of the international monetary system are different not only in scale but in kind from those of the rest of the world. These are the countries which principally hold and use reserves for international monetary purposes; and their reserve needs are a primary concern of the international system. Those who hold this view see no serious technical or political problem in limited groups. Important precedents already exist in the EPU, EMA,⁹ the provision for mutual assistance in the EEC,⁷

and the GAB. The outside world has always accepted such groups provided that they are not detrimental to outside interests or, a fortiori, that they operate in the general interests of the system as, for example, the limited group of the GAB is designed to do.

Paragraph 119: The other view, while recognizing that precedents exist and that such groups as the members of the G.A.B. may operate to the general advantage of the system as a whole, considers that arrangements concerned with the liquidity of the international monetary system as a whole should, in principle, be of a worldwide nature. As regards the danger of unsound decisions being reached if the management were widely representative, those who share this view reminded the Group that, while the views of all participants in the international monetary system are heard in the Fund, the ultimate decisions remain in the hands of the limited number of countries which are chiefly responsible for the system's successful working. To establish a management group to which only the larger industrial countries were admitted would mean arbitrarily excluding countries of proven credit and ability in managing their external finances. The growth of reserves outside the Group of Ten during the past decade, for example, averaged some \$485 mn. a year.

Paragraph 120: (ii) Width of distribution and circulation of the asset.—In favor of keeping the ownership and circulation of the asset within a limited group of industrialized countries, it was argued that an international asset must be based on credit and that the credit of those who back it must therefore be unquestioned. There must be no room for doubt whether the asset will, in practice, be honored in operation or, ultimately, in liquidation. Deliberately created new reserve assets must, of their nature, initially be distributed without the recipients' having had to forego real resources in order to earn them, but will thereafter command real resources. Care is therefore needed in establishing the group in which they are to be used. A reserve asset is characterized by the expectation that, if it flows out, it should ordinarily be reconstituted in due time. Assets which are specifically created to fulfill the reserve function should, consequently, be distributed only to countries whose balance of payments is likely to move between deficit and surplus and which are, therefore, able to assume the obligations as well as the rights entailed in the convention and its working. More generally, a system which meets the reserve needs of the larger nations will, in practice, benefit all countries.

Paragraph 121: The other view here, while recognizing the logic of some of the points made, considers that the limited arrangement would be exposed to disadvantages which would outweigh the advantages claimed for it. For a group of industrially-advanced countries to increase, by a stroke of the pen, as it were, their own monetary reserves and appear to make themselves thereby the richer, would invite criticism from other countries, who would declare that their own need for more elbow room in their international payments was, proportionately, no less than that of the members of the group. A number of the smaller countries could show that they have maintained a good reserve position and that their balance of payments' record compares favorably with that of countries within the group. It would be arbitrary to deny participation to such countries. In any limited membership, the difficulty of borderline cases is likely to arise. For this reason, those who hold this view favor an approach that is not strictly limited in the width of membership. They prefer an approach that embodies a self-qualifying element and would therefore be more open than a grouping that is strictly limited to a small number of countries. They point out that many countries throughout

the world feel, or will feel, a need for growing reserves; yet countries excluded from the group would be able to increase their reserves only by surrendering real resources or attracting capital inflow. To exclude these countries would risk creating a sense of discrimination which would hamper monetary cooperation and understanding and which might well lead to demand for compensation in other ways. As a technical matter, the more limited the group the more likely it is that individual members of the group will accumulate an undue amount of the new asset; this would occur if such members, even when in payments' balance with the entire world, had a surplus with the group and a deficit with the rest of the world.

Paragraph 122: Some members felt that membership for purposes of management need not necessarily be identical with membership for purposes of distribution and use of the reserve asset.

The Role of the I.M.F.

Paragraph 124: As regards deliberate reserve creation, however, the following arguments against an approach through the Fund were supplied, mainly by one of our members; certain of these arguments were supported by some other members of the Study Group.

(i) To give to the Fund the power to create and distribute at its initiative new unconditional reserve assets might impair its ability to perform its role of custodian of monetary discipline, which is based on the granting of conditional credits of limited duration.

(ii) Generally, the ordinary rules of weighted voting in the Fund, which, in fact, give a decisive influence to a very few countries with the largest quotas, do not seem appropriate to the handling of such a powerful instrument as across-the-board reserve creation, which should be under the control of a group comprising all the largest industrial countries.

(iii) Moreover, the difficulty of drawing a line inside the Fund between members who would and members who would not benefit from across-the-board creation of reserve assets would entail the risk that assets which, by their nature, should flow back and forth, would be distributed to countries showing a persistent tendency to remain in deficit. In practice, it seems politically and psychologically extremely difficult, if not impossible, to introduce inside the Fund a discrimination among its members by the way of a qualifying criterion—e.g., countries whose currency has been drawn.

(iv) As to the self-qualifying element which would result from the fact that an across-the-board increase in gold tranche positions would not immediately accrue to countries with outstanding drawings in their credit tranches, its effects would not have much practical significance as between those who qualified and those who did not. It makes little difference to the former, because of their good position and record in the Fund, whether their drawing rights are automatic or of the kind now available to them in the first credit tranche, nor would the associated addition to total drawing facilities be of great significance to them; whereas the latter would receive a benefit in an appreciable de facto mitigation of their repayment obligation, insofar as any amount repaid in their new automatic tranche can easily be redrawn.

(v) The use of reserve positions in the Fund has certain disadvantages. In most schemes of Fund reserve creation, it would require a drawing on the Fund or the realization of a loan claim on terms similar to those of a drawing; and some countries have, in the past, shown reluctance to draw on the Fund. On the one hand, a country has to represent a balance-of-payments need before drawing; on the other hand, it might have to repay before its reserves have improved, or to allow,

⁷ European Monetary Agreement.

⁹ European Economic Community.

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I ask unanimous consent that the Reston article from August 27, New York Times, entitled "Saigon: Indicators of a Long War" be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SAIGON: INDICATORS OF A LONG WAR
(By James Reston)

SAIGON.—All the available information here indicates that both sides are planning for a long war. The Vietcong seem to be regrouping in the central highlands while our forces build up their bases along the coast, and neither side seems to have the capacity to stop the other from continuing this process.

In the cities of Communist North Vietnam, Western diplomats report that their inquiries about negotiations are getting no more encouragement now than before the recent U.S. victories. Instead, they are being told by North Vietnamese to get on with their air raid precautions and have been given detailed instructions about where to go in case of the evacuation of Hanoi and Haiphong.

UNDERGROUND BASES

The Vietcong are apparently dug into a number of underground bases in remote areas from which they go out on raiding parties by small units and to which they return to rest and replenish their supplies.

American intelligence indicates that despite the present level of bombing, these tactical Communist bases can probably be supplied with enough arms and ammunition, and moved around from place to place, to keep the war going for a long time.

Meanwhile, even in the present optimistic mood on our side, the most our officials will say is that this is only "the beginning of the beginning."

The U.S. bases and supply areas are being constructed on a scale far larger than is necessary to care for the present level of American forces—therefore it is assumed that the buildup will continue well beyond what has been announced so far.

POWER COMPLEX

In fact, the U.S. base at Canranh, which has one of the best natural ports in Asia, is being developed into another Okinawa, not merely for the purpose of this war, but as a major power complex from which American officials hope a wider alliance of Asian nations, with the help of the United States, will eventually be able to contain the expansion of China.

There is a fundamental change in the tone of official American conversation here. It is not only that American planners are convinced that they have avoided a military defeat and can now hold these growing power centers along the sea, but that they believe they have found the instruments and techniques for fighting effectively on the fringes of Asia against guerrilla limited warfare.

This may or may not be right. It is probably a valid assumption at the present level of the Vietcong attacks, but the Communists so far have committed only three regiments of the 325th North Vietnamese Division, and they have an uncommitted organized army of over 300,000 behind that in the north.

The first question, therefore, is how much more manpower the North Vietnamese will send south. The expectation here is that they will certainly make up their recent losses and equal whatever manpower Washington puts in, probably with volunteers from North Korea (to match the South Korean division coming here on our side).

Meanwhile, the United States and South Vietnamese forces will be concentrating on the Vietcong underground redoubts. The intelligence advantage still lies with the

Communists, but it is improving on the allied side. For example it was a Vietcong defector who provided the detailed information on enemy strength and positions that led to the marine attack and victory at Chulal.

An intelligence gap, however, still remains, and even Chulal did not provide as much information and materiel as officials expected. They got only about 100 Vietcong weapons there. Only six of the captured fighters turned out to be hard core Vietcong regulars, and though two Vietcong battalions were virtually wiped out, a large part of two other Vietcong battalions apparently got away.

Modern instruments of detection, however, are helping the allies. Planes equipped with infrared sensor devices can spot the Vietcong redoubts by tracing heat from fires or even automobile engines on the ground.

The armed helicopter is proving to be highly effective primarily in getting men to a given spot quickly to follow up intelligence leads and in strafing entrenched defenders with machinegun fire from positions directly over the field of battle.

SITUATION STABILIZED

These theories are only beginning to be tested. The fear of collapse, so strong here last August, and again last November, has passed. The military situation has been stabilized—that is about all that can be said—and the Communists clearly have the manpower in the North to tip it once more to their favor if they choose to do so.

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, Reston next spells out the paradox that to win we must hit with our military power and do so with immense force and that indeed the military power is beginning to tell on the Vietcong now. But in the very process we run the risk of losing the vital allegiance of the people of South Vietnam who naturally see little benefit in a scorched earth policy that may kill Vietcong but in the process kill, maim, burn them and destroy their little village. Reston puts the paradox like this:

But above all the people of Vietnam are trapped in a power struggle beyond their understanding or control. Maybe nothing can be done about it, but somewhere in a corner of the mind, their tragedy must be remembered. For we could win the war and lose the people, and that would be the final irony of the story.

I ask unanimous consent that the article by James Reston from yesterday's New York Times, entitled "Saigon: The Tragic Paradox of Vietnam" be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SAIGON: THE TRAGIC PARADOX OF VIETNAM
(By James Reston)

SAIGON, August 28.—The American military buildup in Vietnam is beginning to rattle the windows. You don't need official figures to feel what's happening. The sky over Saigon is alive with noisy aerial boxcars, stuttering helicopters and flashing Skyhawk fighter-bombers. The airports, the bars and the restaurants are now all a little high—not to mention the G.I.'s on leave—and even the fancy hotels are beginning to smell like a men's locker room.

When Uncle Sam moves in, somebody has to move over. The concentrated power of America is staggering, and this may prove to be the most significant paradox of the war. For this power is now hitting not only the Vietcong, but the civil population of South Vietnam, and the critical question is which of these two will endure the punishment.

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

There seems to be no dissent here—even among the diplomats of allied countries that have been critical of American policy in the last 6 months—that the application of American power in this country since last February has transformed the military situation.

Between last August and last February, the Vietcong ranged through the central lowlands virtually at will. The South Vietnamese Army could not, or at least did not, stop them. Over 100,000 refugees were driven into the coastal city of QuiNhon alone, and the disintegration within the South Vietnamese Army and Government was alarming.

Recognizing this, the United States took three decisions that have stabilized the military situation. It extended the war into North Vietnam. It increased its forces here to over 125,000, and it sanctioned the use of American air, artillery and naval strikes against the Vietcong in South Vietnam.

WAR IN THE HAMLETS

This last decision to search for and destroy the enemy anywhere in South Vietnam is regarded here as the most effective and least understood of the three decisions. The Vietcong, which used to raid the countryside and then bivouac in the hamlets, are now being hounded from the air and attacked in the hamlets.

The people in the South Vietnam hamlets now know that if they dig tunnels for the Vietcong and give them food and refuge, they are likely to be shelled or bombed, and this has undoubtedly complicated the enemy's problem, but it has raised a new problem on our side. For it has caused great suffering and destruction among the civilian population.

This country is now beginning to take a frightful beating from the air. Yesterday's U.S. communique, for example, listed 57 Air Force strikes in a single day in the southernmost area of South Vietnam, and 95 strikes elsewhere in South Vietnam by Navy fighter-bombers from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. *Coral Sea*. The Navy said it dropped more than 65 tons of bombs and estimated that it killed five Vietcong, destroyed 102 structures and damaged 65.

In the Mekong Delta in the south, the Navy also reported that the destroyer U.S.S. *De Haven* fired over 355 rounds of 5-inch ammunition at Vietcong assembly areas on shore. "Spotters estimated very good effect on the targets," the communique said. Six buildings were destroyed with very good shrapnel effect over a very large area.

The only difficulty with this is that the Vietcong do not usually have isolated training and supply centers apart from the South Vietnamese, but operate among the people where the shrapnel has "very good effect" on Communists and nonCommunists alike.

AMERICAN DILEMMA

This is the devilish dilemma of the present American strategy in the South. We are chasing guerrillas with bombs and it is apparently having much more effect on the Vietcong than anybody thought possible, but in the process, we are attacking and often destroying the areas we want to pacify.

It is now estimated that there are between 500,000 and 600,000 refugees in this country. Most of them are living in shacks and pens that would make the slums of Harlem look like the LBJ ranch. And by the end of the year U.S. airpower will be more than doubled.

This country normally produces a rice surplus, but this year the United States has already had to commit itself to bring in 100,000 tons of rice to make up for the lost production of peasants driven off the land.

MULTIPLE TRAP

There has been some ominous muttering about this American bombing policy in

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South Vietnam by Thich Tri Quang, the powerful Buddhist bonze from Hue, but otherwise the tragedy has been accepted with remarkable calm, maybe because people here expect the white man to bring "trouble."

Nevertheless, this is a problem that will get worse as more bombers are added. War has a way of trapping everybody concerned. The United States is trapped between accepting the Vietcong attacks or striking back and hitting the South Vietnamese in the process. In a way the Vietcong is trapped between the power of the United States and China.

But above all, the people of Vietnam are trapped in a power struggle beyond their understanding or control. Maybe nothing can be done about it, but somewhere in a corner of the mind, their tragedy must be remembered. For we could win the war and lose the people, and that would be the final irony of the story.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that the implications of military deescalation to accommodate negotiations in Vietnam—implications discussed thoughtfully with some tough sticking points included in a recent New York Times editorial—be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEESCALATION IN VIETNAM

For more than 10 years the United States has been following a policy of escalation in its military commitment in Vietnam. Now it has apparently decided to explore whether deescalation might not offer a more promising approach to a settlement of the southeast Asian conflict. The efforts Washington is currently making in this direction represent an invaluable addition to the numerous other peace feelers that have been and still are being undertaken.

The newest proposal, as Times diplomatic correspondent Max Frankel reports, is that Hanoi withdraw some or all of the 325th North Vietnamese Division it has sent into South Vietnam, in return for a reduction or cessation of American bombing of North Vietnam. This report clarifies the American offer of August 8—revealed in Britain's white paper yesterday—to initiate another "perhaps more prolonged" pause in the bombing as quid pro quo for an "appropriate and commensurate" military step by North Vietnam.

There is little reason, of course, to be over-optimistic about the new approach at this stage. No reply has yet come from Hanoi and many past attempts have failed. The British white paper details in 62 documents the innumerable attempts that have been made since February by London, Washington, and other governments to bring about talks. All have been fiercely rejected by Peking and—occasionally after hesitation—by Hanoi. "Yet," as the official British commentary points out, "there is room for hope."

There have been a number of recent hints that interest in negotiations may be reviving in North Vietnam. Hanoi has admitted and held discussions with envoys from Britain and Ghana. Secretary General Thant, as reported in press dispatches earlier this week, has made undisclosed new peace proposals to "the Governments most concerned" at the request of Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg.

The substance of a settlement—or at least its main principles—is being commented on by both sides in unilateral public and private statements so explicit that they virtually take on the form of preliminary informal exchanges. Thus, President Johnson on July 28 offered to discuss Premier Pham Van Dong's four-point peace proposals of April 8. And Ho Chi Minh replied in some detail on

August 13 to probing questions put to him by the French scholar, Philippe Devillers, in a cabled interview published in *Le Monde* of Paris. The North Vietnamese President made it clear that, when the time comes, Hanoi would prefer an international Geneva-style conference rather than bilateral negotiations with Washington. He insisted that the United States actually accept the four points in principle before a conference is held.

For the most part, the four points merely summarize the key elements in the 1954 Geneva agreements, which President Johnson has said the United States also accepts as the basis for a settlement. There is one difficult sticking point. The Communists have added a demand—not in the Geneva accords—that the Saigon Government be reconstituted before elections are held. They demand a coalition regime in which the Vietcong would participate and even, in some versions, be given "a decisive voice."

Negotiations, if opened, could go on for a long time. Militarily, both sides are digging in for a long war. But the increasing evidence that neither can win a victory by force of arms makes a political settlement essential. Deescalation would be the best way to begin.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, last week I placed in the RECORD the superlative statement by Secretary Rusk on the significance of our commitment to Vietnam. Today's Washington Post carries a column by Roscoe Drummond which spells out with direct quotes the deep convictions of President Johnson on this question of just why we are in Vietnam and how very deeply our commitment in Vietnam goes.

I ask unanimous consent that the Drummond article be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

L.B.J. AND HONOR—NAGGING QUESTIONS (By Roscoe Drummond)

There are some questions only the President of the United States can answer. It is his constitutional duty to conduct foreign relations. He alone is Commander in Chief.

Many Americans still have nagging questions about why we are in Vietnam. The President's most effective answers often come when he is speaking informally and spontaneously—rather than in his set speeches. This column reports the President speaking informally and spontaneously on questions which concern the safety of the United States and the peace of the world—and gives his candid and innermost thinking.

Question: "Was there no other choice but to defend South Vietnam?"

President Johnson: "You know the major alternatives as well as I do and I won't take time to repeat them. You can think of a thousand problems, a thousand complications, about this ball of wax out there in southeast Asia. We had to confront this utter complexity and find a few simple, fundamental propositions on which this Nation moves."

"And what are those simple propositions? One, the fact of aggression. Can the thousands of armed men and large quantities of arms sent down from North Vietnam to South Vietnam take over that country by force? If you don't believe this is really aggression, go see Bob McNamara or Dean Rusk and let them show you the complete evidence."

Question: "Do we really have a commitment to South Vietnam?"

President Johnson: "I'm not going to take the case to the Supreme Court as to whether we were legally compelled to come to her defense. Our commitment was voluntarily

and deliberately entered into on the basis of the SEATO treaty, on the basis of the bilateral arrangements made by President Eisenhower with the Government of South Vietnam, on the basis of annual appropriations thoroughly discussed with the Congress for aid in both the economic and political affairs of South Vietnam for 10 years, on the basis of the commitments of three Presidents—we have a commitment."

"We know we have it. The South Vietnamese know we have it. The Communists know we have it. So, if anyone doubts we have a commitment, let them look at the facts."

Question: "What does that commitment mean?"

President Johnson: "What does it mean? If I can leave you with one thought, I would say that you must understand that the integrity of the American commitment is the principal pillar of peace in the world today. If anything happens to the integrity of that commitment, we are lost."

"I have used the word 'honor' with respect to Vietnam. When I have done so, some have tended to say, 'Oh, dear me' as if this were an expression out of 18th-century diplomacy—for a king who had become offended because his daughter was refused in marriage to the son of another king."

Question: "What do you mean by 'honor'?"

President Johnson: "Let me tell you what honor means—concretely. Toward the end of President Eisenhower's administration, he was presented by Chairman Khrushchev with an ultimatum: Six months in Berlin and out. And President Eisenhower said to Chairman Khrushchev, 'No, Mr. Chairman, you can't do that to the United States.' And Khrushchev had to believe it."

"In the summer of 1961, Khrushchev said to President Kennedy: 'Out of Berlin, or there will be war.' This was at the Vienna talks in June, 1961. President Kennedy looked him straight in the eye and said, 'Mr. Chairman, if that is what you want, that is what you will have. It will be a cold winter.' And it was utterly (vital) to the life of this Nation that Mr. Khrushchev believed that."

"When the Russian missiles entered Cuba, President Kennedy had to say to Mr. Khrushchev, 'Mr. Chairman, these missiles have to go. Period. Paragraph. They have got to go. And you have a chance to get them out peacefully, but they have got to go.' The life of this Nation depended at that moment on Mr. Khrushchev believing him."

"We are now saying to Hanoi and Peking, 'Gentlemen, you are not going to take over South Vietnam. You're not going to do it.'"

"If you were a Berliner, if you were a Thai, you would be living on the basis of the American commitment. If Moscow or Peking or Hanoi ever thought that commitment was not worth anything, then no one is in more danger than you and I in this room. The entire Nation is in danger."

"That is what honor means in this situation. It takes guts. You have the life of nations wrapped up in this word."

This is what the integrity of America's commitment to South Vietnam means to the President of the United States.

HEART OF PRICE STABILITY: LABOR COSTS DROP, WHILE WAGES RISE

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, if there is one particularly persistent and harmful economic myth it is that higher wages necessarily cause higher production costs and higher prices.

The fact is that increased productivity—the capacity of each worker to produce more—can enable him to earn